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1.1. Introduction 
 
The Czech Republic, as well as the other new Member States of the European Union, belongs 
to the group of EU countries most vigorously supporting the future EU enlargement. The 
support runs across the political spectrum as well as public opinion. According to the last 
Eurobarometer poll, as much as 65% of the Czech population supports further EU 
enlargement. Explicit anti-enlargement rhetoric cannot be found in the programme of any of 
the parliamentary parties. The strong support can be explained by relatively fresh accession 
memory, recognising the importance of the EU enlargement policy for creating a stable and 
democratic environment, but also by a genuine belief in the need for overcoming post-Cold 
War divisions in Europe, and the right of non-EU countries to stability and prosperity, which 
has changed the region of Central Europe in the last fifteen years beyond recognition. 
 
However, the picture becomes more complex if we look at the individual potential candidates. 
While relatively prosperous Western European countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway) and 
Croatia enjoy very high support, poorer countries of the Western Balkans, Turkey and 
Ukraine are by far not so well off.  
 
This chapter will look more in detail at how the EU aspirations of one important Eastern EU 
neighbour – Ukraine – are perceived in the Czech Republic. It will also try to provide some 
suggestions as to what factors might be a determinant of the Czech position on Ukraine and in 
what ways the Czech Republic is likely to treat Ukraine vis-à-vis its European aspirations. 
 
1.2. Czech Attitudes Towards the EU Enlargement and Ukraine in Particular  
 
When exploring the Czech attitudes towards the “European choice” of Ukraine, one has to 
acknowledge that this country does not represent a priority in the general discourse on future 
EU enlargement. This is despite the generally very warm welcome by both the political 
representation and the media of the outcome of the Orange Revolution in December 2004 and 
victory of the pro-European stream in creating the successive government. Despite this, the 
signals sent by the Czech politicians towards the Ukrainian political establishment were rather 
vague, communicating general support for the political and economic direction of the country 
but not making any clear signals of support to establish firmer links with the EU, such as a 
roadmap to the EU candidacy or the enhancement of relations within the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
 
As far as public opinion is concerned, compared to other countries, the Czech Republic is not 
very receptive towards the idea of seeing Ukraine as an EU Member State in the foreseeable 
future. The latest two public opinion polls (Eurobarometer 64.2 and 63.4) even show a drop in 
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support for Ukrainian membership in the EU; while at the beginning of 2005 46% of people 
supported the membership of Ukraine and 45% opposed it, in June 2006 only 40% wanted 
Ukraine to join the EU while 49% opposed it. This trend is in sharp contrast to the public 
attitudes in most other new Member States, notably Poland (65% in favour, 19% against), 
Lithuania (67% in favour, 14% against) or Slovenia (66% in favour, 27% against). Thus, the 
Czech public opinion towards Ukraine exhibits a pattern rather similar to some old EU 
Member States than the one identified among most of the newcomers (e.g. in Denmark the 
respective figures are 41% for and 48% against, in Belgium 44% for and 52% against or in 
France 38% for and 48% against). 
 
Providing an explanation for this trend is not easy. Firstly, the support for Ukraine to join the 
EU dropped among the new EU Member States as well, and in some cases it has been even 
more dramatic than in the Czech Republic. For instance in Poland (often viewed as the 
primary advocate in recognising Ukraine as a future EU candidate), the support decreased by 
11% between spring and autumn 2005 (while in case of the Czech Republic it fell “only” 6%). 
The failing support for the membership of Ukraine might probably be explained by a possible 
mistrust towards future EU enlargement following the French and Dutch “no” to the 
Constitutional Treaty or difficult negotiations over the EU budget. However, it must be 
underlined that this might be part of a more general trend of convergence between the public 
opinion in the EU-15 and EU-10 (in terms of decreasing public support for further 
enlargement) rather than driven by motives specific to the Ukrainian case.  
 
As far as the Czech political establishment is concerned, the rather lukewarm attitude towards 
Ukraine might partially stem from the highlighted internal problems encountered in the EU in 
2005 over the unsure fate of the Constitutional Treaty and future direction of the EU. The 
second explanation is that Ukraine is not a top priority in terms of Czech views on the 
enlargement policy. The Czech diplomacy  recognises the structured approach to enlargement 
policy based on previous EU commitments, thus pushing for a faster approach vis-à-vis 
countries with a clear membership perspective (Turkey, Western Balkans) and only then 
dealing with the eventual membership of the EU Eastern neighbours (such as Ukraine, 
Moldova, etc.). In balancing the importance of Ukraine as a strategic priority for the Czech 
diplomacy with concerns over the settlement of internal problems of the EU, the latter 
consideration clearly seems to outweigh the former one. The regional politics does not seem 
to bear much weight either. Despite the repeated calls of Poland on other EU Member States, 
and its Visegrád partners in particular, to take the Ukrainian calls for “European choice” more 
seriously, the Czech political class and diplomacy did not seem to respond very 
enthusiastically. The only noticeable political move in terms of recognising the political 
importance of the Orange Revolution was the lifting of fees for Czech visas for Ukrainian 
citizens as a response to the decision of the Ukrainian government in August 2005 to lift the 
visas for all EU citizens. However, this gesture was also more reactive than pro-active. Poland 
and Hungary negotiated asymmetrical visa regimes (not charging fees on visas) even before 
the EU accession, and most of the new Member States in the region (such as Slovakia or the 
Baltic countries) responded with the same move.  
 
1.3. Public Perceptions of the Ukrainians and Ukraine in the Czech Society 
 
The feature that seems to dominate the Czech discourse on Ukraine is that of Ukraine as a 
source of cheap labour, especially in construction, household and retail sectors. Ukrainians are 
notorious for migrating to the Czech Republic for work, lured by higher salaries, cultural 
closeness (language barriers are not as large due to the common Slavonic roots of the Czechs 
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and Ukrainians) and relatively flexible conditions which make it possible for them to 
undertake jobs as self-employed individuals (although the legality of such a status is 
disputable and the system is known for being abused). The Ukrainian presence in the country 
is far from negligible; although the official statistics of long-term resident Ukrainians in the 
Czech Republic quote figures of around 70,000 (including those who have already acquired 
Czech citizenship, or some repatriated people of Czech origin, such as the so-called Volyně 
Czechs), the unofficial estimates might be as high as 200,000. This makes the Ukrainians the 
second largest migrant community after Slovaks who, however, since the split of 
Czechoslovakia have always enjoyed a preferential status compared to other foreigners.  
 
The data available on the public attitudes towards Ukrainians does not seem to give much 
ground for optimism. In the March 2005 poll of the CVVM centre, the Ukrainians received 
one of the worst rankings among the foreigners surveyed – worse marks were awarded only to 
Turks, Kurds, Afghanis, Iraqis and Palestinians (overall the survey included 24 nationalities). 
Out of the national minorities residing in the Czech Republic, the numbers were equally one 
of the worst, with only nationals of some Balkan countries and Romas receiving worse 
marks.1  
 
The numerous and still growing Ukrainian community in the Czech Republic might 
potentially play a role in the perception of the Ukrainians among the Czechs, but also in the 
shift of the Czech policy on Ukraine. Examples of other countries show that if the migrant 
community is well organised and effective it can have an impact on policy-making processes 
in the host country. It would probably be too ambitious to expect the organisations 
representing Ukrainians to have an impact similar to the Israeli lobby with the US 
administration and Congress, as it has incomparable resources and building relations with the 
state institutions takes considerable time. However, smaller and less resourceful diasporas can 
be influential even in Europe, such as for example the Armenian organisations in different 
European countries who have with various degrees of success lobbied the countries on the 
issue of opening EU accession negotiations with Turkey (through conditioning this process on 
the recognition of the Armenian genocide by Turkey). Thus, depending on how well 
organised and goal-oriented the Ukrainian organisations in the Czech Republic are, they can 
bring the issue of the “European choice” of Ukraine more to the public debate. However, that 
would require a shift from the current focus on assisting the Ukrainian fellow citizens with 
integration in the Czech society or promoting Ukrainian culture into more strategic, policy 
oriented goals. So far, this does not seem to be the case. Many of the Ukrainians who come to 
the Czech Republic do so solely for the purpose of improving their own economic situation 
and that of their families back home, without necessarily wanting to acquire Czech citizenship 
and thus being less inclined to intervene in Czech politics.  
 
The press coverage of Ukrainians seems to foster a rather negative perception of this 
community. The survey of media reporting on Ukrainians2 seems to suggest that such 
coverage is mostly associated with criminality, namely murders and robberies. Stories on 
Ukrainian workers usually also point out cases associated with their illegal employment but 
also with the shortage of labour in some regions. It is also worth noting a group of articles 
which use the term “Ukrainian” as a parallel, synonym or idiom. For instance members of the 
ODS party used the reference to practices used in this party as those of the “Ukrainian mafia”. 
                                                 
1 This sample included the following nationalities: Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Jews, Vietnamese, 
Russians, Ukrainians, citizens of the Balkan countries and the Romas (ranked in decreasing order of popularity). 
2 Klvačová, P.  and T. Bitrich (2003). “Hard to make out foreigners: How the foreigners are (not) written about 
in the Czech press.” Multikulturní centrum Praha.  
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Particularly the references to the “Ukrainian mafia” are rather widespread, without explaining 
the meaning of this idiom. Generally, the connotations in which the term “Ukrainian” is used 
are exclusively pejorative. On the contrary, references conveying rather positive attitudes 
towards Ukraine or Ukrainians, such as describing Ukrainian associations and their initiatives 
(such as celebrations of Ukrainian feasts), are fairly rare.  
 
Reporting on Ukraine as a country has significantly changed during and after the Orange 
Revolution, with many journalists exhibiting sympathy to the changes there or even making 
parallels with the November 1989 events in Prague. However, the coverage of political 
changes was limited to serious media whose impact on the general Czech public opinion 
remains rather limited. This can explain a still negative prevailing attitude to the Ukrainians 
and a lack of interest in the European future of this country within the Czech society.  
 
1.4. Czech Activism towards Eastern Europe (the Czech “Eastern” Policy) 
 
One could argue that the “Eastern dimension” was not the foremost focus of Czech foreign 
policy, at least since mid-1990s, certainly not compared to Poland or even Slovakia. Foreign 
policy activism focused on the NATO and EU accessions as prime foreign policy goals. The 
improvement of relations with immediate neighbours, especially Germany and Austria, was 
next on the agenda. However, in general, Czech foreign policy was aimed more westward 
rather than eastward in the whole course of the EU and NATO accession processes. 
 
Once a member of these two organisations, it seems that the floor for refocusing the Czech 
policy would be greater. In fact, the Czech Foreign Ministry discovered that there could be an 
added value in having special “Eastern” expertise which would enable the country to project 
Czech interests through the EU institutions. However, in this sense one might think that the 
Czech interest in the East emerged too late. Poland has been developing the “Eastern agenda” 
and particularly the Ukrainian agenda consistently throughout the 1990s, and it has already 
made an impact at the EU level. Poland negotiated the postponement of the introduction of 
visas for Ukrainians as late as a few months prior to the EU accession, which made the 
impression in Brussels that this issue is really important. Polish government was one of the 
first to provide input into the first instruments underpinning the European neighbourhood 
policy. And finally Kwaśniewski (together with Adamkus) travelled to Kiev in December 
2004 to engage on behalf of the EU in negotiating a solution to the electoral impasse.  
 
The Eastern policy is re-emerging in the Czech foreign policy agenda, but Ukraine does not 
seem to be a key component of it. On the contrary, it could be argued that two of Ukraine’s 
neighbours, namely Russia and Belarus, are gaining more attention. Russia is emerging as a 
new power, as an important player in the world energy game and as a strategic partner to 
Europe in many areas (at least in the four common spaces in which it had concluded 
agreements with the EU). The growing awareness in Europe of this fact seems to be reflected 
in new initiatives such as the plans of the forthcoming German presidency on “anchoring” 
Russia in Europe.3 Even the Czech diplomacy recognises that the incoming German 
presidency will play a key role in shaping future relations between the EU and Russia, not 
least because a new framework agreement between the two will start to be negotiated during 
this period. The Czech interest in Russia might further be facilitated by the fact that, unlike 
                                                 
3 “Germany wants to bind Russia to the EU.” EU Observer, 1 September 2006 
[http://euobserver.com/9/22312/?rk=1] 
Odstraněno: or Hungary. 
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for other countries in the region (notably Poland4 or the Baltic countries), relations with 
Russia are short of contentious issues, underlined by the recent visit of Putin to Prague. On 
the other hand, possible contentious points can still emerge, for instance in connection with 
the US Ministry of Defence proposal to locate part of the US anti-missile base (radars) on the 
Czech territory which has already received a very lukewarm reception in Moscow. It can be 
assumed that the line of the current Czech government towards Russia will be somewhat 
harder, taking into consideration a strongly pro-US tuning of some members of cabinet, 
especially in case of Alexandr Vondra, the Vice- premier for European issues.  
 
The reason for the increasing interest of the Czech Republic in Belarus is driven by a different 
motive, which is related to the Czech perceived expertise on supporting transformation know-
how. The Transformation Co-operation Unit (TRANS) established in July 2004 focuses on 
Belarus – along with Cuba – as a primary country of interest although recently the scope of 
focus has been extended to include countries such as Ukraine, Moldova or selected countries 
of Western Balkans (Serbia and Bosnia). Also the government has approved in March 2006 
additional funding for the Czech NGOs co-operating with Belarus opposition. Similarly, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate established a special subcommittee focused on 
Belarus, aiming at expanding support for the Belarus dissent.  
 
The prevailing position of the Czech Foreign Ministry is that in the current state of affairs it is 
unrealistic to push for an explicit recognition of the European choice of Ukraine which would 
most markedly be demonstrated by the candidate status, although strategically the Czechs 
could align with the Poles on the issue. One can often hear from Czech diplomats that the 
Czechs and Poles follow the same aims, only the means differ. The key element on which the 
Czech diplomacy is focusing is the negotiation of the new EU-Ukraine agreement after the 
expiry of the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)5, which could come to 
force around 2008 and the negotiating mandate will be brought forward soon. One of the 
concerns is that as the EU-Ukraine agreement will be concluded after the new agreement with 
Russia (the PCA with Russia expires in 2007), the content of the EU-Russia treaty will be 
simply be copied in the new agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Another concern is that 
perhaps too much effort will be devoted to the preamble to the new agreement, with the 
assumption that the Ukrainian representation (as well as the Polish one) will focus too much 
on at least some implicit recognition of membership aspirations, and not much attention will 
be paid to the real substance of the new treaty.  
 
On the other hand, quite a lot of progress can be achieved on the economic integration of 
Ukraine with the EU with the conclusion of a free trade agreement and the creation of a free 
trade zone. Although the Czech position is still not clear, a swift liberalisation of trade could 
possibly damage some of the Czech producers in areas such as steel or agriculture. Similarly, 
the accession of Ukraine to the WTO is seen as a priority which could supposedly be 
realistically achieved by the end of 2006 and the process could be easier than with Russia (as 
for Russia it will be difficult to establish a bilateral trade deal with the US, for Ukraine the 
only contentious countries are Taiwan and Kyrgyzstan where the agreement could be found 
more easily).  
                                                 
4 The evidence of very complicated relations between Poland and Russia witnessed at EU level was a recent 
Polish veto over the start of negotiating the new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between EU and 
Russia because of allegedly unfounded restrictions on the expert of Polish meat to Russia.  
5 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement,which came in force in 1998 and represents the basic legal framework 
for the relations between Ukraine and the EU. It will expire in 2008.  
Naformátováno: Čeština
Odstraněno: recently 
established 
Odstraněno: Recently 
Odstraněno: can 
Odstraněno: be 
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Similar importance is attached to the visa facilitation agreement with Ukraine, seen as one of 
the tangible outcomes of mutual rapprochement between the EU and Ukraine. However, the 
current wording of the agreement (initialled during the EU – Ukraine summit in Helsinki in 
October 2006) will in fact imply a less liberal regime applied currently by the new Member 
States of the EU who do not charge fees for visas to any category of applicants. This 
possibility will have to be lifted with the full integration of the new Member States into the 
Schengen area (expected to happen on 1 January 2008). The visa issue continues to be of 
prime importance. Apart from the already mentioned lifting of fees on Czech visas for 
Ukrainian citizens, the Czech Republic decided toopen a new consulate-general in Donetsk in 
Eastern Ukraine. This – apart from making life easier for visa applicants in Eastern Ukraine - 
illustrates the effort of the Czech diplomacy to engage in less “traditional” and more pro-
Russian regions of Ukraine, i.e.generally in the eastern part of the country.  
 
Ukraine is seen as an important element in the future development of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy and energy security in Europe. 
Especially for the Czech Republic Ukraine does matter as a transition country, as most of the 
supplies of gas from Russia run through its territory. The attitude of Ukraine is also critical 
vis-à-vis the Transnistrian conflict, especially towards the EU Border Assistance Mission 
launched in this disputed territory. However, less alignment can be seen in relation to Belarus, 
where the Czech Republic is pushing for a harder stance towards the Lukashenka regime at 
the EU level, while Ukraine has so far kept a rather cautious approach. It has not for instance 
joined the EU-wide travel ban on high-ranking representatives of the Lukashenka regime due 
to economic interests in Belarus which could possibly damage the Ukrainian business 
interests therein. 
 
The Czech Foreign Ministry proposed an action plan focusing on areas such as energy or the 
environment, but it was noted that this initiative was met with rather lukewarm interest on the 
part of the Ukrainian political representation. However, the situation seems to be improving, 
and an inter-departmental commission should be established soon to help Ukraine progress on 
these issues.  
 
Some expectations can be associated with the Czech presidency of the EU in the first half of 
2009. It might be that the new agreement with Ukraine will be concluded under the Czech 
presidency, which would give the country some additional leverage on influencing the 
outcome of negotiations. Most probably, the negotiations will be concluded before 2009. 
Apart from this, the Czech government will have many other important issues on the agenda 
for its EU presidency, such as the EU budget reform, the preparations for the appointment for 
the European Parliament elections and for the appointment of the new European Commission, 
and possibly the settlement of the Constitutional Treaty (it is probable that another 
Intergovernmental Conference will proceed under the Czech presidency). How much space 
will be allotted for Ukraine is thus a question, and the composition of the government and 
who is going to be in charge of foreign affairs might be an important factor here.  
 
 
1.5. Internal Developments in the Czech Republic, the EU and in Ukraine Itself  
 
These factors are probably not specific to the Czech attitudes towards the EU aspirations of 
Ukraine. They reflect an interconnection between the perception of continuing enlargement 
being complemented by ongoing deepening of the EU. On this issue, the position of the Czech 
political representation is not clear. It is likely that a lot will depend on the current 
Odstraněno: ¶
 7 
constellation of the Czech government. While the centre-left government might see the 
deepening, mostly manifested by resolving the EU constitutional crisis, as a necessary 
precondition for opening any EU accession prospects for the countries who do not currently 
enjoy a candidate status, the centre-right government might be willing to proceed with 
enlargement even if the constitutional issue is left unsettled. The current climate in the EU, 
however, is not very favourable – demonstrated recently by statements of Jose Manuel 
Barroso, president of the European Commission (which has always been perceived as a 
defender of EU enlargement) proposing to halt further enlargement promises until the 
constitutional issue is settled.  
 
Secondly, the internal developments in Ukraine will play a crucial role, too. The rather 
lukewarm reaction to the Orange Revolution compared to Poland as well as the outcome of 
the 2006 parliamentary elections reflect the lack of conviction that Ukraine has made a final 
choice. Ukraine is still very much perceived and portrayed as a country with deep internal 
divisions regarding its foreign policy orientation (e.g. having an “orange” west and “blue” 
east), with a strong influence of the Kremlin and a buffer zone between the EU and Russia.6 
With the post-election situation with the Orange camp disintegrating and the deal between the 
two originally rival camps, that of Yushchenko and Yanukovych re-emerging, the enthusiasm 
for supporting Ukraine on its way to the EU might grow even stronger.7 Recent developments 
show that Yanukovych as the new prime minister might be interested in keeping a balanced 
relationship with both Moscow and Brussels and to reach some tangible deals with the EU 
such as an enhanced free trade agreement8 rather than pushing for an explicit recognition of 
candidate aspirations. However, the reaction in the Czech press to the outcome of the 
elections did not mark such negative reactions and the fact that Yanukovych was given a 
chance to form a government is actually perceived as a sign of the growing maturity of the 
young Ukrainian democracy.9 From the Czech perspective, however, it seems that 
Yanukovych will be forging the relations with the EU while his enthusiasm for Ukraine 
integrating more closely with NATO is seen as potentially posing more problems for its 
relations with Moscow. This attitude seems to be confirmed by some recent gestures of 
Yanukovych. We can recall a harsh criticism of foreign minister Boris Tarasyuk who in 
January 2007 on the official visit in Prague defended pro-European choice of Ukraine, stating 
that Ukraine should be integrated to both EU and NATO as soon as possible10. Yanukovych 
not only disputed legitimacy and legality of the whole visit (which was allegedly not 
approved by him) but he even blamed Tarasyuk for damaging the interests of Ukraine and 
threatened with prosecuting him.  
 
1.6. Conclusions: What Might Change the Czech Perception of Ukraine and Make It 
More Supportive of EU Membership Aspirations? 
 
To conclude, it is clear that the reasons why the Czech Republic could become more 
enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine on its road to the EU lie with the developments in the 
EU, in the Czech Republic and in Ukraine. 
 
                                                 
6 See e.g.Robejšek, P., Ukrajina za hranicí nové Evropy (Ukraine beyond New Europe´s Boundaries), Tyden, 3 
March 2006. [http://www.tyden.cz/text.asp?rid=8&show=text&tid=20371] 
7 Ibid 
8 Beatty, A.. “Yanukovych touts trade deal with the EU.” European Voice, Vol. 12 No. 33, September 2006. 
9 See e.g. Černý, A. “The Ukraine Has Changed.” Hospodářské noviny, 4 August 2006 
10 http://aktualne.centrum.cz/zahranici/evropa/clanek.phtml?id=332312 
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At the EU level, the basic pre-condition is overcoming what is at least perceived to be the 
major crisis, following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by two founding members. 
Unfortunately, the Czech Republic, also given quite turbulent developments internally, has 
almost forgotten the issue which was definitely not a priority in the last year.11 The political 
representation will have to formulate a position and discuss and suggest possible scenarios for 
solving the current deadlock, which will ultimately become a necessary pre-condition for 
continuing enlargement that seems to be so much supported by the political establishment.  
The government which won the vote of confidence in January 2007 will most probably 
develop a pro-active eastern policy including relations with Ukraine, especially through 
transformation co-operation which now focuses on Ukraine as one of the priority areas and 
maybe will even make this area on of the priorities for the Czech presidency of the EU in 
2009. But a big question mark hangs over the fragile stability and opaque future of this 
government.  
 
Further on part of the Czech Republic, several additional factors will play a role. Firstly, the 
“Eastern” agenda of the Czech foreign policy is coming to the fore again. However, it is not 
clear whether it can rather act as a catalyst or an inhibitor of a more supportive and active 
Czech policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. The complicated triangular relations between Russia, the EU 
and Ukraine might make the Czech Republic oscillate between the three parties, keeping the 
fragile balance rather than deciding on a confrontation.  
 
The gradual emancipation of the Ukrainian community in the Czech Republic might mark 
some shifts in the Czech positions, too. So far, the image is predominantly negative, 
associated with crime (including organised crime) or illegal employment. Changing this 
negative stereotype can be precipitated by, for example, having a success story such as a 
Ukrainian immigrant achieving a high Czech political position or occupying one of the top 
positions in the Czech business. A more robust programme for the integration of the largely 
illegal Ukrainian labour migrants could make a difference as well. It will send a signal that the 
Czech Republic needs labour migration and is able to create a framework for its regulation, as 
well as for the integration of the Ukrainian migrant community. This idea is already shared by 
some parts of public administration and politicians, demonstrated by the inclusion of Ukraine 
in the programme of managed labour migration by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
Furthermore, the Ukrainian migrant community needs to become more self-conscious. Once it 
shifts from focusing on merely helping the Ukrainian expatriates to handle the formalities 
regarding their residence and labour paperwork or from promoting Ukrainian culture to more 
politically articulated stances, the Czech political representation and media will start to take it 
more seriously. So far, however, it seems that the Ukrainian organisations do not have such 
ambitions.  
 
Business can have an impact on the Czech policy towards Ukraine, once Czech investment in 
and trade with Ukraine start to grow. The growth of trade has been immense since the Czech 
Republic’s accession to the EU, growing by 50.6 % in 2005 and by as much as 80.9 % in the 
first half of 2006,12 and the rapidly developing Ukrainian economy has a huge potential for 
attracting the Czech exporters in traditionally strong areas such as machinery, engineering, 
cars, etc. Also investment is starting to attract more attention of Czech companies, such as the 
PPT group investing between 45 to 60 million USD into the Ukrainian banking sector. Other 
potentially big investors such as CEZ (which is already making acquisitions in some Western 
                                                 
11 The Czech Republic did not ratify the Constitutional Treaty and did not even set terms for the ratification.  
12 Available at: http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/clanky/ukrajina-souhrnne-informace/obchodni-a-ekonomicka-
spoluprace-s-cr/1001236/24747/ 
Odstraněno: Given the 
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Balkan countries) or Skoda might follow this example. The businesses will have an interest in 
a more transparent regulatory environment, a more liberal trade regime, clearer rules of public 
procurement, etc. The best way of doing this is through closer links with the EU, so the 
businesses can actually become one of the main supporters of closer links between Ukraine 
and the EU.  
 
One must be aware of potential dangers of this trend though. For instance recent proposal of 
the European Comission to force the car producers to cut down the carbon dioxide emissions 
was immediately interpreted by the Czech media as eventually leading to moving the car 
productions from the Czech Republic to the East (explicitly mentioning Ukraine) because of 
the savings incurred. Although this was an isolated statement so far, it must be borne in mind 
that in the future even in Central Europe we can face some tricky debates about delocalisation 
and moving the production to the East where the cheap labour is which we recently witnessed 
in the EU-15. 
 
Tourism can be an important incentive for raising the interest of the Czechs in Ukraine and 
eliminating some of the stereotypes currently present in the Czech milieu. Ukraine is not the 
most typical tourist destination, however, in terms of number of trips of people visiting this 
country it ranks quite high – in the 16th place in terms of number of trips undertaken by 
Czechs in 2005.13 The statistics available do not reveal how many people actually visit 
Ukraine for leisure and how many for business. However, it can be assumed that a more pro-
active promotion of Ukraine as an interesting tourist destination could lead to a better 
acquaintance of the Czechs with Ukraine. This results in a more positive perception of it as a 
“European” country. This is, however, a task for the Ukrainian government and tourism 
promotion services.  
 
Given the current state of affairs in the EU, the Czech Republic and Ukraine, it cannot be 
realistically expected that the Czech Republic will become a strong advocate for recognizing 
Ukraine as a candidate for EU membership. The Czech Republic will rather try to foster 
relations between the two entities through closer economic integration, such as supporting 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO or forging an enhanced agreement with the EU, leading to a 
gradual establishment of a free trade zone between them. Although strategically it is 
important for the Czech Republic that Ukraine makes a ‘European’ rather than ‘Russian 
choice’, the Czech political representation as well as diplomacy does not feel strong enough to 
influence this decision. Moreover, the internal political situation in the Czech Republic is 
unstable and problematic following the outcome of the 2006 parliamentary elections. Without 
a strong political mandate, the Czech policy on Ukraine is not likely to move forward. 
Thirdly, the same would apply to the internal political situation in Ukraine itself. While 
Yushchenko after he took the presidential office at the beginning of 2005 sent strong signals 
to the West that it is the primary intention of his new government to foster the pro-EU 
orientation of his country, the Yanukovych government, which emerged in 2006, is likely to 
take a more cautious course, paying attention to a balanced relationship with both Brussels 
and Moscow. 
                                                 
13 Available at: http://www.mmr.cz/upload/files/cestovni_ruch/060714_cr_v_cr_aktualizace.doc 
